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COMMENT
Controlling the Use of Force: The
Charter Regime and the Summit
Agreements
William D. Jackson
Introduction("%N MANY OCCASIONS since 1945 questions have beenV raised concerning the meaning and application of the United
Nations Charter's provisions regarding the control of force. Con-
troversy has centered on Article 2, paragraph 4 - the general pro-
hibition against the use of force
or threat thereof - and Arti-
THE AUTHOR: WILLIAM D. JACKSON cles 51 and 53, which stipulate
(B.A., Florida State University; M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Virginia) is an As- exceptions to the general pro-
sistant Professor of Political Science at scription contained in Article
Miami University (Ohio). His teaching 2(4). Under the best of cir-
s p e c i a l ty i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w . c u m s t a n e o n e b e s t o t h a v ecumstances one could not have
expected general agreement on
the application of the Charter's standards to the complexities of po-
litical conflicts in the real world. The best of circumstances have
certainly not been present since 1945. There has been instead an
exceptional degree of conflict and polarization among governments.
The inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on
the application of the Charter's standards and the conviction of
each power that the other posed a serious and continuing threat to
its interests had a profound impact on attitudes and orientations
toward the Charter regime. Governments interpreted the Charter
in the light of the belief that Permanent Members acting in the
Security Council would not exercise their primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and'security. Claims regard-
ing the circumstances under which force could be lawfully used
without the approval of the Security Council were also influenced
by these considerations. The attitudes of decisionmakers in the
United States and the Soviet Union toward the Charter were in-
fluenced by images of each other as a continuing threat. These
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images exerted an important influence over decisions by U.S. and
Soviet policy-makers regarding the use of force and furthered con-
troversy over the meaning and application of Articles 51 and 53 of
the Charter.
Legal policies including claims with respect to the scope and ap-
plication of the inherent right of individual and collective self-de-
fense have not been unaffected by the strategic policy concerns
which preoccupied decisionmakers during the confrontation period
of the Cold War. Having identified their own national security
with the formation of alliance systems and the preservation of these
systems against not only direct attack, but in some cases against
changes of regime which were perceived to have adverse political
consequences, both the United States and the Soviet Union have
made broad claims concerning the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense and each has invoked the right in circumstances chal-
lenged by the other.' Deliberate distortions of fact notwithstand-
ing, conflicting worldviews have produced radically divergent char-
acterizations of the situations which involve the use of force in
collective self-defense. A regime entitled to lawfully request assis-
tance to resist "aggression" in the view of one power has not been
so entitled to seek help to non-existing "aggression" in the view of
the other. Controversy over the exercise of the right of self-defense
1 Among the instances in which such controversies have occurred are Lebanon (1958)
and Czechoslovakia (1968). The claims and counter-claims are well illustrated in the fol-
lowing documents:
Lebanon: See Address of President Eisenhower, 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182 (1958);
Remarks of President Eisenhower to the General Assembly, 3rd Em. Spec. Sess. U.N.
GAOR 7-10 (1958); cf, Remarks of A. Gromyko (Representative of the Soviet Union)
to the General Assembly, id. at 10-16. The Soviet Representative referred to the invo-
cation of Article 51 with respect to the U.S. action in Lebanon as "extremely far-fetched,
as is evident from the fact that, under the said Article 51, the right of collective self-de-
fense may be invoked 'if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions.' " Id. at 12.
See also U.N. Doc. A/3876 (18 Aug. 1958) and Wright, United States Intervention
in The Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
Czechoslovakia: See TASS Statement on Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 21
Aug. 1968, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1283 (1968); see also U.N. Doc. A/
8759 (21 Aug. 1968); cf. Reis, Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of Czecho-
slovakia, 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 394, 396 (1968). See also T. Franck, Who Killed
Article 2(4)? 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORD
POLITICS: VERBAL STRATEGY AMONG THE SUPERPOWERS (1972).
U.S. claims to use force in collective self-defense in Indo-China were of course also
challenged by the Soviets. Vietnam presents a unique set of issues especially concerning
the interpretation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. U.S. claims regarding the use of
force in collective self-defense are found in: U.S. Dep't. of State, Office of the Legal Ad-
viser, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 4 March
1966, reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 565 (1966); Stevenson, U.S. Military Action in
Cambodia: Questions of International Law, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 765 (1970).
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has not only concerned the level of intervention which constitutes
an armed attack in specific cases and the right of a particular regime
to request assistance. There has also been uncertainty over whether
Article 51 permits the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense
if, and only if, an armed attack occurs or whether the article pre-
serves undiminished a customary right to use pre-emptive force in
anticipation of an imminent attack.2
Another important controversy concerning the right to use force
has ensued over the meaning and application of the provisions of
Article 53 of the Charter. Article 53 permits the use of force by re-
gional organizations upon the approval of the Security Council for
the purpose of maintaining the peace. Each power, however, has
used force under the authority of regional organizations to enforce
the peace in regions in which it was politically dominant without
the prior explicit approval of the Security Council. In practice the
requirement of prior Security Council authorization has not been
recognized. The term authorization has been "stretched" by the
United States to include failure to disapprove.' At the same time,
the United States has challenged the Soviet claim that the Warsaw
Pact is a regional organization entitled to undertake such regional
enforcement measures.4
While the two powers have verbally challenged each other's
claims to act in self-defense or to conduct regional enforcement
2 See, e.g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 597 (1963); D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-192
(1958); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Interna-
tional Law, 81 Recueil Des Cours, Vol. II, 455, 495-499 (1952); cf. L. HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 233-236 (1968); Wright, The Cuban
Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963); and P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NA-
TIONS 165-166 (1948). See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2737, FIRST REPORT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
22 (1946); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2702, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF
ATOMIC ENERGY: GROWTH OF A POLICY 106, 164 (1946); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN
A VIOLENT WORLD 425-435 (1968).
3 See A. CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 61 (1974).
The United States also asserted that the Cuban Quarantine did not constitute "en-
forcement action" within the meaning of Article 53. See Department of State Memor-
andum: Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba, 23 Oct. 1962, reprinted in A. CHAYES,
supra at 146.
See also Claude, The OAS, the U.N. and the United States, INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION, No. 547 (March, 1964); Franck, supra note 1, at 822-35; Moore, The
Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order, in 3 C. BLACK
& R. FALK, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1971); Henkin,
Comment, in A. CHAYES, supra note 3, at 152.
4 See Reis, Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, 59
DEP'T STATE BULL. 394, 396 (1968).
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operations without the authorization of the Security Council, effec-
tive opposition to the exercise of these claims has been absent. The
fear of policymakers of each power, that opposition to the other's
use of force in defense of asserted security interests would lead to a
general conflagration, has led to speculation concerning the tacit ac-
ceptance by the two Superpowers of spheres of influence in which
each power grants to the other expanded discretion with respect
to the use of force.5 The impact on the legal order of the effective
exercise of claims to use force in collective self-defense and under
the authority of regional organizations is presently problematic.6
There can be no doubt that the progressive development of in-
ternational legal order requires formal clarification of the circum-
stances in which the invocation of the right of self-defense is gener-
ally accepted as lawful,7 as well as agreement on the circumstances
under which force can be used under the authority of regional orga-
nizations. An effective legal order, as McDougal and Feliciano
correctly argue, must permit policies designed to meet or otherwise
deter or rebuff unlawful coercion.8 This includes recognition of the
right of individual and collective self-defense in circumstances in
which community institutions are unable to act to prevent major
violations of political independence and territorial integrity. It also
includes recognition of the right to use force under the authority
of regional organization in the case of threats to the peace even if it
is not possible to obtain prior approval by the Security Council. At
-the same time, however, it must be recognized that policies which
have been characterized as a defensive reaction to unlawful coer-
cion or as otherwise necessary to remove threats to the peace by one
Superpower have had the effect of increasing tensions and confirm-
ing images, held by decision makers of the opposing bloc, of that
state as an expansionist power. These larger consequences cannot
be ignored. It is a desirable objective of an international legal or-
der that the reasonableness of the exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defense, or the necessity of regional enforcement
5 See, e.g., T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 1, at 114-17.
6 See U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 196, United States Statement on Spheres
of Influence, 23 Aug. 1968, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1299 (1968).
7 See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION ch. 3 (1961); see
also D. BOwETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); Brownlie, The Use
of Force in Selt-Defense, 37 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 183 (1961).
8 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 130; see also McDougal, supra
note 2.
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measures, in any given circumstance be apparent to the international
community. Moreover, a use of force by either Superpower, no
matter how justified, which does not appear to the decisionmakers
and policy-influential elites of the other to be a reasonable applica-
tion of an agreed rule will have a destabilizing effect on ddtente.
The Summit Agreements and the Resolution of Controversy
In two important agreements reached at the 1972 and 1973 sum-
mit meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union addressed
the subject of the control of force and the maintenance of peace.
At the Moscow Summit in May, 1972, the two powers concluded a
declaration of Basic Principles of Relations. This entire document
reflects the remarkable progress of detente. For the purpose of this
comment, however, the first three "principles" are most important
insofar as they bear directly on the problem of achieving agreement
on the regulation of the use of force. The declaration reads:
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, ...
Have agreed as follows:
First. They will proceed from the common determination that
in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual
relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ide-
ology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not
obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on
the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in inter-
nal affairs and mutual advantage.
Second. The USA and the USSR attach major importance to
preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dan-
gerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their
utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak
of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual
relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences
by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding is-
sues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommo-
dation and mutual benefit.
Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage
at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent
with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and
strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR
are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on
the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat
of force.
Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility,
as do other countries which are permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that
conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase
international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote con-
[Vol. 7: 84
CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE
ditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and
will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.9
The following year at the Washington Summit, the United
States and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement on the Pre-
vention of Nuclear War, in which they agreed: to act so as to avoid
dangerous exacerbations of their relations and so as to "exclude"
the outbreak of nuclear war between themselves or between either
and other states; "to proceed from the premise that each Party will
refrain from the threat or the use of force against the other Party,
against the allies of the other Party and against other countries in
circumstances which may endanger international peace and security;"
and to consult with each other and to make every effort to avert the
risk of nuclear war should such a risk appear between the two or
between either and a third party.1°
Considerable importance has been attached to these agreements
by ranking policy-makers in both Washington and Moscow as mea-
sures which add stability to detente." Although the Parties repre-
sent the Agreements as proceeding from their obligations under the
Charter, and hence profess no incompatibility between the require-
ments of stabilizing ddtente as defined by the Superpowers and the
obligations of the powers under the Charter, the real effect of these
instruments on the Charter regime depends upon the interpreta-
tions the Parties place on the major provisions. Several aspects of
these agreements and their possible implications for the develop-
ment of the legal order will be considered here.
The Charter Regime, the Summit Agreements and
the Legal Control of the Use of Force
In their agreement on Basic Principles the United States and
the Soviet Union declare that they "make no claims for themselves
and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special
rights or advantages in world affairs." 2  This provision caused at
9 Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, 29 May 1973, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 756 (1972).
10 The Agreement entered into force upon conclusion. The official English text of the
Agreement may be found in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 896 (1973). A copy of the
Russian text appears in Pravda, 23 June 1973, at 1. An interesting general discussion
of the significance of the Agreement may be found in a news conference held by the Presi-
dent's National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on 23 June 1973. The tran-
script of the conference is reprinted in 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 141 (1973).
11 See Kissinger, supra note 10, at 143, see also G. Arbatov in Kommunist, No. 3
(Feb., 1973), at 101-113.
12 Basic Principles of Relations, Eleventh.
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least one legal scholar to conclude that the Soviet Union appeared
to have renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yet, G. Arbatov, a
prominent Soviet scholar, director of the America Institute and par-
ticipant in the recent series of summit meetings, writing in Kom-
munist, concluded that the Basic Principles of Relations is signifi-
cant because it represents U.S. acceptance of the principle of peace-
ful coexistence.1" In the Soviet view, the Brezhnev Doctrine, it will
be recalled, was not incompatible with "peaceful coexistence."
It is Article II of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear
War which deals most directly with the subject of the control of
force. Some questions may be raised over the meaning of this arti-
cle. While the obligation to refrain from the threat or the use of
force contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter is qualified
by the phrases "in their international relations," "against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state" and "in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," Ar-
ticle II of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War pro-
vides only that the parties refrain from the threat or use of force
"against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and
against other countries in circumstances which may endanger inter-
national peace and security." According to Dr. Kissinger, Article II
of the Agreement "does not apply to the situation in Cambodia
(i.e., the situation as of June 1973 which included U.S. bombing in
support of the Lon Nol Government) inasmuch as that situation
was in force at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. "14 In
the U.S. view, however, "The movement into sovereign countries
of large forces would not be consistent with the spirit of the agree-
ment.'"" Whether or not the Soviet Union shares these interpreta-
tions of the Agreement is not clear. The nature of the understand-
ing surrounding this provision, however, is of some significance to
the development of the legal order. It is unclear whether Article
II is intended to effect a narrowing or a confirmation of the discre-
13 Schwebel, The Brezhnev Doctrine Repealed and Peaceful Coexistence Enacted, 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 816 (1972). For an interesting commentary on the agreement on Basic
Principles of Relations by a Soviet scholar, see the analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations by G.
Arbatov, supra note 11. Arbatov concludes that the significance of the agreement on
Basic Principles of Relations is that it represents the acceptance by the U.S. of peaceful
coexistence as "the main contractual principle governing the relation of the two Powers."
Acceptance of this principle by the U.S., in Arbatov's view, represents an important
shift in U.S. policy.
14 Kissinger news conference, supra note 10, at 143.
15 Id. at 144. [Emphasis added.]
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tion, in certain circumstances, of the United States and the Soviet
Union to interpret Articles 51 as well as 53.
Other provisions of the Summit Agreements, however, do estab-
lish a clear and less controversial basis for the supplementation of
the Charter regime. The commitment of the Superpowers to con-
trol policies capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of relations
expressed in the Second Principle of the Basic Principles of Rela-
tions, and in Article I of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nu-
clear War, establishes a useful, and conceptually novel, juridical
basis for approaching the control of force and can provide a legal
point of departure for the supplementation of the Charter regime.
This obligation to refrain from acts which exacerbate relations can
be extended to cover acts not covered by the Charter, such as the
deployment of new weapons systems or the transfer or sale of arms
to legitimate governments. It can provide a juridical basis for the
solution of a problem described by Stanley Hoffmann vis-a-vis the
regulation of situations in which the crisis provoking act, while per-
fectly legal by prevailing standards, tends to perform a transforma-
tion in the distribution of power which requires one of the major
powers to act in self-defense.' 6
The commitment to consult in the event of the "appearance of
a risk" of nuclear war contained in Article IV of the Agreement
on the Prevention of Nuclear War is a step in the direction of deal-
ing with the problems posed in the regulation of the use of force in
anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear age. While the Agree-
ment does not explicitly address itself to the question of anticipatory
attacks, it clarifies an obligation between the Parties to consult in
the event either detects the "appearance of a risk" of nuclear war
and to make every effort to avert such risks. The Agreement is
deficient, however, insofar as it does not clarify the obligations of
either power vis-a-vis third parties who may be involved in the nu-
clear risk situation. Presumably, the peaceful settlement obligations
of the Parties under the Charter require either Party concerned over
the "appearance" of a risk of nuclear war to enter into direct dis-
cussions with the other Government(s) involved. Such nuclear
risk situations, however, present special difficulties which may not
be susceptible to resolution in the absence of effective corollary arms
control measures.
One cannot yet conclude that the Soviet Union has repudiated
16 4offmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in S. HOFFMANN & K.
DEUTSCH, THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 31 (1968).
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the Brezhnev Doctrine or, for that matter, that either Superpower
has forsworn the possibility of defining under certain circumstances
the threat of a change of regime precipitated with limited external
intervention as a threat justifying the use of force in self-defense.
Nor can one conclude that the problems surrounding the regulation
of the use of force in anticipatory self-defense have been resolved.
While the Superpowers are in the process of elaborating the legal
basis of their relations, the character of this elaboration is not yet
fully apparent. The impact of these agreements on the pattern of
expectations regarding the use of force prevailing between national
security bureaucracies of the United States and the Soviet Union is
difficult to assess. If shared understandings exist regarding the inter-
pretation of the provisions of these agreements, these understand-
ings extend only to a limited inner circle of policy-makers. Such
understandings would be jeopardized by any changes in Govern-
ment or governing personnel. Progress on development of the legal
order certainly requires a more explicit and specific characterization
of lawful and unlawful uses of force as well as the more specific
characterization of and agreement upon policies which have the ef-
fect of exacerbating relations between the two powers. Progress
also requires a recognition of the fact that policies characterized as
permissible under Articles 51 and 53 of the Charter have had the ef-
fect of increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union. In order to exert a significant impact on policy, law between
the two powers must achieve greater specificity and precision than
has thus far been achieved at the summits. Moreover, in order to
exert a lasting impact, there must be widely shared understanding
of the concrete meaning of such agreements for the conduct of pol-
icy. Agreements supplemented by understandings to which only a
limited circle of decisionmakers are privy are by their nature likely
to be of only ephemeral significance.
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